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Abstract 
Modern techniques, such as fault tret analysis, can be used to obtain 
engineering descriptions of specific fire protection systems. The analysis 
allows establishment of an optimum level of fire protection, and evaluates the 
level of protection provided by various systems. A prime example: The 
application to fusion energy experiments. 
Introduction 
Fusion energy systems may be the ultimate source of stationary electrical 
power within the next 50 years. Currently, there are several strategies for 
obtaining the conditions of fusion. Each method primarily involves confining 
hydrogen isotope plasma so that the product of plasma density and time can 
achieve a critical value (The Lawson Criteria where density (TJ) X time (T) = 
10I 4 ion-sec) where fusion to helium occurs, accompanied by the release of 
heat and fast neutrons. This process is roughly analogous to the chemical 
reactions of combustion, correspondingly; initiating the fusion reaction is 
called "ignition." 
Two generic confinement philosophies for obtaining the density-time 
product leading to fusion ignition are available: 
• Inertial confinement, where high energy beams are focused on a minute 
target of fuel gas creating an extremely high density for very short 
periods (Figure 1). 
t Magentic confinement, where ionized fuel is contained (or for some 
systems compressed) by magnetic fields at relatively low density. In 
these systems the period of confinement is substantially longer 
(Figure 2). 
Regardless of the strategy used, each is extremely complex and require 
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special accommodations and provisions. Typical facilities necessary for 
fusion experiments include: 
• Large electrical power systems and switch yards. 
• Cryogenic plants for superconducting magnets. 
• Complex vacuum systems. 
• Computer complexes for control, diagnostic and research purposes. 
• Laser systems, both for inertial energy supply and for sophisticated 
diagnostic purposes. 
• High-voltage, neutral-beam accelerators for plasma heating. 
• Clean rooms for maintaining sensitive electrical and optical 
equipment. 
In direct support of these facilities are: 
• Large machine- and mechanical-fabrication shops. 
• Electrical and electronic shops. 
i Maintenance and clerical support. 
• Computer maintenance and repair personnel. 
• Specific supply repositories. 
i Health and safety services. 
Figure 3 illustrates the components of MFTF (Mirror Fusion Test Facility) 
at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and the complexity of 
fusion energy experiments. 
In an emerging technology like the development of fusion energy, it is 
likely that systems will evolve that provide a new spectrum of danger to the 
experimenters and support personnel. In addition, the potential for 
destructive accidents can be so extensive as to interfere with programmatic 
progress or cause project cancellation, should the amount of damage exceed 
some critical proportion of the capital worth of the facility. Moveover, 
because current fusion experiments are the precursors of tommarrow's 
fusion-power reactors, it is important to ensure that all hazards are 
identified and controlled. 
Fusion-energy experiments operate with periodic surges of huge quantities 
of electrical and/or optical energy which generally results in the production 
of 10l6 to 10'-9 neutrons per input pulse and equivalent intense thermal 
stresses. These energy surges create special safety problems that must be 
addressed in the planning stages of the experiments. The safety problems are 
multidiciplinary in nature, e.g., 
1 Ionizing and nonionizing radiation 
• Stray magnetic fields 
• Electrical discharge and electric shock 
• Stray laser beam effects 
• Chemical toxicity 
• Fire and smoke effects 
Because many of these problems can occur simultaneously, integrated 
applications of safety techniques are required to affect solutions to 
potential safety faults. 
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APPROACH 
we believe that a research protocol must be established where safety 
science is developed at a parallel rate to engineering and scientific advances 
of emerging energy technologies. To this end, we are involved in a modest 
program funded by the Operational and Environmental Safety Division (OES) of 
the Department of Energy (DOE) to ensure that fire protection measures for 
fusion energy experiments (FEE) evolve concurrently with the advances in 
fusion energy development. Effective for fire protection for FEE requires 
adequate knowledge of the normal operation of generic fusion experiments so 
that faults resulting in unwanted fire can be effectively prevented or 
protected against. 
Our initial efforts were concentrated on learning the operational 
characteristics of selected FEE's and identifying easily defined fire-risk 
conditions that exist contemporarally, or that were projected by operating 
personnel(1). Our next step was to conduct detailed studies into the 
interaction between fire hazard and fire protection in Lawrence Livermore 
National Laboratory (LLNL) FEE's. We used available analytical techniques for 
assessing fire risk and accepted statistics for determining potential fault 
modes of operational automatic fire protection systems (FPS)'. 
We intended to follow the analytical protocol diagrammed in Figure 4. 
Note that our ultimate goal, a risk assessment of the facility, is contingent 
on an adequate understanding of the three input parameters to the flow chart, 
i.e., fire growth, FPS reliability, and FPS effectiveness. We were already 
aware that the state of the art of fire-growth analysis for large enclosures 
containing complicated fuel arrays was very primitive. We also knew that very 
little quantitative data are available about the effectiveness of automatic 
fire-protection systems in a wide variety of fire scenarios. However, we 
mistakenly believed that sufficient quantitative information existed on the 
operational characteristics and reliability of FPS's. In fact, we found 
minimal data regarding system components. Thus, our first task was to 
understand the functions of existing FPS used in contemporary fusion 
experiments. 
ANALYSIS PROTOCOL FOR FIRE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 
We used fault-tree analysis(3) as a tool to help us understand the 
operation of fire-management systems for specific magnetic and inertial 
confinement fusion experiments at LLNL. Fault trees are diagrams that 
describe an undesired event by accounting for all elements that comprise the 
system of interest. The fault tree is structured so that the undesired event 
appears at the top of the tree. The sequence of events that leads to a system 
failure is shown below the top event. These events are logically linked to 
the undesirable event by branches which are in turn linked to standard "or" 
and "and" gates. The fault-mode operation of these items are assessed by 
evaluating their position relative to these logic gates in terms of the 
operational parameters below the item and the results of the operations above 
the item. Each event is both qualitatively and quantitatively analyzed using 
codes based on the concepts of Boolean Algebra W. 
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Perhaps the most useful qualitative aspect of fault trees is to provide a 
vehicle for discussion between the analyzer and persons familiar with the 
analyzed system, i.e., it's possible to construct the tree in a variety of 
ways, but the results would be questionable if there was no iterative 
discussion between the systems designer and the fault-tree analyst. 
Figure 5 shows the upper layers of a fault tree for the system shown 
schematically in Figure 6. This system is installed in an enclosure that 
contains magnetic fusion experiments (HFE). In this case, the top event is 
the failure of a modified pre-action sprinkler system to emit water, assuming 
that the intensity of the fire was sufficient to activate a perfectly working 
system. 
The entire tree has about 4 tries the components shown in Figure 5. 
Figure 7 shows a hypothetical subsection cf the total tree indicating the 
relationships and detail possible in the matrix of fault trees. 
Using the computer code FTAP( 5), we found a total of 713 ninimal cutsets 
(system failure modes) for our unit model. Me classified these cutsets 
according to order, i.e., according to the number of basic events they 
contained. For example, if a minimal cutset contained a single-point failure, 
it was of order 1; if it contained two event failures, it was of order 2; 
etc. Of the 713 minimal, cutsets 42 were of order 1, 32 were of order 2, 14 
were of order 3, and 625 were of order 4. 
Of the 42 single-point failures, 18 involved component failures in the 
fire-indicating and zone-indicating units; 5 involved human error, 
performance-related failures, or secondary failures in the sprinkler heads or 
the smoke detectors; 1 involved the unavailability of offsite power for more 
than 24 hours; 1 involved the unavailability of service water; and 17 involved 
component failures in the piping and valving system. 
The minimal cutsets of orders 2 through 4 involved a combination of (1) 
primary failures in the smoke detectors, (2) primary failures in the sprinkler 
heads, and (3) failures in the electrical and hydraulic components. 
Quantitative analysis of the failure probability for the entire fire 
management ensemble requires iteration of the component reliability and system 
maintenance. 
Components of the fire-protection system were subjected to one of the 
following three maintenance actions: 
• No repair. 
• Announced failure. 
• Unannounced failure. 
An undetected plug in the drypipe system, for example, is a no-repair case. 
To calculate the failure of system components, we had to know the 
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following reliability parameters: 
• Failure rate, \ (the conditional probability of failure). 
• Inspection interval, 8 (3 months for the 2XIIB fire protection 
system). 
t Repair time, T. 
We used the computer code IMPORTANCE^) to calculate (1) system 
unavailability and (2) the quantitative importance of basic events and minimal 
cutsets contributing to system failure. Our results showed that the 
probability of a system failing upon demand (i.e., in the event of a fire) is 
0.18 and 9 basic events could contribute to its failure. In Table 1 these 
events are listed and ranked according to their relative importance in 
contributing to system failure. 
A similar analysis was made on a facility entirely committed to a major 
inertial fusion experiment (IFE). Figure 8, a block diagram of the elements 
of the IFE fire-management systems, shows the relationship between the 
detection and response circuits. Wet-pipe sprinkler arrays are the primary 
fire-suppression components for the high bay experimental areas. These units 
are inherently more fail-safe than the dry-pipe, pre-action systems that 
protect the magnetic fusion experiment. Note that the critical components of 
both the magnetic- and inertial-fusion fire-management systems are the zone-
and fire-indicating units (ZIU & FIUJ.They are extremely imporant because they 
relay any problem or an emergency signal directly to the fire department's 
24-hour dispatch unit. In addition, they provide the power to most of the 
automatic detection units. 
Each system has its own peculiarities of responding to a fire situation. 
In the MFE pre-action system, (see Figure 6) if certain critical electrical 
components in the ZIU or FIU fail, no signal would be relayed to the fire 
department. As a result, the pre-action valve would not receive a fire 
confirmation signal from the detector circuit and would not open. 
Consequently, no water would be available to the sprinkler branches. 
In the IFE fire-management system, however, this problem is significantly 
reduced because of the presence of the independent wet-pipe sprinkler 
systems. These sprinklers will operate regardless of the condition of the 
FIU/ZIU circuits. However, the fire department's arrival would be delayed 
until they received a manual response from some other source. Figure 9 
schematically compares the relative complexity of both fire-management systems. 
Figure 10 highlights the differences in the basic design of the 
experiments and structures housing the MFE (2XIIB & BETA II) and IFE 
(SHIVA/NOVA). Perhaps the most notable difference is the age of the 
structure. The IFE building was designed specifically for that operation. 
Enclosure boundaries were installed to serve a variety of purposes (e.g. 
demarking generically different experimental areas, protection from ionizing 
radiation, fire barriers, and atmospheric control). Both life-support and 
fire-protection appliances are modern and designed to address the problems of 
specific experimental components. 
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The MFE is contained in a building constructed almost two decades ago 
(Bldg. 435). It was designed for initial experiments on mirror fusion and has 
housed six major experimental machines and a host of small fusion-related 
experiments since its construction. Originally, the building did not have any 
automatic fire-protection capability. But, when the capitol value and 
complexity of the experiments increased, mandatory fire-protection measures 
were authorized by the federal agencies that fund the program. 
Fire-management improvements have been added over tne years to establish the 
present system. The requirement for a dry-pipe, pre-action system coupled to 
the smoke detector array was specified to ensure that water would not be 
accidentally released on the experiment. This specification was made because 
of the concern of the project electrical engineers about electrical shock 
hazards. 
COMPARATIVE RESULTS 
Using fault tree analysis, we determined the fault modes and failure rates 
for the total SHIVA fire management system. Table 2 lists the preliminary 
results based on this analysis. The most important findings were the high 
reliability of the wet-pipe sprinkler system and the relatively minor role 
played by the ZIU/FIU circuits in the reliability analysis. We were unable to 
complete quantitative analysis for the incipient fire detection circuit* or 
the Halon 1301 computer fire-suppression systems* because of the lack of 
available information about their components. 
In Table 3 the probability of the wet-pipe sprinkler and the dry pipe 
preaction sprinkler system failing is compared. Because the operation of the 
dry-pipe preaction system depends so heavily on the ZIU/FIU circuits, its 
chance for failure upon demand is nearly 10 times that of the wet-pipe system. 
We also analyzed the possibility of an inadvertent release of water from 
the dry-pipe system as a result of component failure. (Note, human error was 
not factored into this analysis). Our calculated value of approximately 
10-6 p e r y e a r i S comparable tn industrial experience for wet-pipe systems. Hence, the propensity for electrical engineers to specify waterless 
fire-protection systems because of a concern over shock hazards is unfounded 
by accepted engineering analysis. Moreover, the reliability of water 
intensive fire protection systems is established in the same way. 
* The incipient fire detection system senses smoke particulate in the exhaust 
plenum of ventilation ducts of the laser amplifier section of the SHIVA 
experiment. 
# This is an under-floor suppression system designed to suppress fires that 
might occur in the innumerable electrical power and signal cables necessary 
for computer operations. 
CONCLUSIONS 
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Our calculations of system reliability are based on incomplete data 
because component reliability information is sparce, and for some items 
nonexistent. Our sources for reliability and failure-rate data included: 
• Factory Mutual Corporation 
• National Fire Protection Association 
• United Kingdom Atomic Energy Agency 
• IEEE Standard #500 
• Wash - 1400 (Reactor Safety Study) 
In addition to these sources, and when no documented information was 
available, we surveyed local and national organizations that had pertinent 
expertise on the subject for facts, estimates, and conjectures about the 
performance of fire-management components and systems. To confirm our 
analyses, we compared our results of the probability of a "successful" 
sprinkler system operation with statistics of sprinkler system effectiveness 
accumulated in the commercial sector (Table 4). We are quite encouraged by 
the agreement between data based on historical experience and our parametric 
analysis. 
Figure 11 reiterates our program objectives. We have established the 
value of fault tree analysis as an analytical tool for defining the 
engineering performance and fault modes of contemporary fire protection 
systems (items B & C). We have used these results to evaluate, on a limited 
basis, a wide variety of international fusion experiments; and, we are 
currently developing a protocol for field-safety engineers to use to evaluate 
the level of fire protection. 
Contemporary fire growth analysis is mainly concentrated in the area of 
residential fire problems. Our attempts to extrapolate promising theories to 
the industrial scale common to fusion energy experiments, results in a family 
of temporal fire growth parameters which vary by 100% in both time and 
intensity. This range is unacceptable, however, we have been able to identify 
critically needed experimental data, which could reduce the variability of the 
modeling results. 
Figure 12 is a conceptual picture of the impact of unwanted fires on the 
components used in fusion experiments. Ideally, when our program is 
completed, we should be able to quantify the coordinates and define the 
structure of the damage curves. In addition, by defining the performance and 
effectiveness of the fire management systems we should be able to reduce fire 
risk to the level where the probability of a significant fire exceeding 
unacceptable levels will be vanishingly small. 
NOTICE 
This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by the United 
States Government. Neither the United States nor the United States 
Department of Energy, nor any of their employees, nor any of their 
contractors, subcontractors, or their employees, makes any warranty, 
express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the 
accuracy, completeness or usefulness of any information, apparatus, 
product or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe 
privateiy-owned rights. 
Reference to a company or product name does not imply approval or 
recommendation of the product by the University of California or the U.S. 
Department of Energy to the exclusion of others that may be suitable. 
7 
REFERENCES 
1 N. Alvares, A. Lipska, Assessment of Fire Hazards in Buildings Housing 
Fusion Energy Experiments, Preprint UCRL 81072. Hay 2, 1978. 
2 N. Alvares, and H. Hasegawa, "Fire Hazard Analysis For Fusion Energy 
Experiments", Fire Safety Journal, 2(1979/80), Preprint UCRL 82320. May 2, 
1979. 
3 H. Lambert, "Systems Safety Analysis and Fault Tree Analyses", UCIO 16238, 
Hay 9, 1973. 
* G. Naanep, H. Lambert and H. Hasegawa, "Fire Protection Study of the 2XUB 
Mirror Fusion Facility: Fourth International System Safety Conference, 
Proceedings. July 9, 1979. 
5 R.R. Willie, "Computer Aided Fault Tree Analysis", Operations Research 
Center, University of California, Berkeley, Rept. ORC 78-14 (1978). 
5 H.E. Lambert and F.M. Gilman, "The Importance Computer Code", Lawrence 
Livermore Laboratory, UCRL-79269 (1977). 
8 
TABLE 1 BASIC EVENTS CONTRIBUTING TO SYSTEM FAILURE 
BASIC EVENT RANK IMPORTANCE 
SMOKE IS INADEQUATE TO IONIZE 1 ,27 
BOTH DETECTORS 
HEAT IS INADEQUATE TO FUSE ALL 1 .27 
FOUR SPRINKLER HEADS 
RECTIFIERaCR5 FAILS OPEN 2 .12 
CIRCUITED 
RECTIFIER-CR1 FAILS OPEN 2 .12 
CIRCUITED 
RECTIFIERaCR2 FAILS OPEN 2 .12 
CIRCUITED 
HEAT IS OBSTRUCTED FROM ALL 3 .05 
FOUR SPRINKLER HEADS 
ALL FOUR SPRINKLER HEADS ARE 3 .05 
INSTALLED IN THE WRONG POSITION 
FUSE F3 FAILS OPEN CIRCUITED 4 ,03 
SWITCH SI: 
CIRCUITED 
1g3 FAILS OPEN 5 ,01 
FAILURES WITHIN THE ZONE-INDICATING UNIT OR THE FIRE-INDICATING 
UNIT ARE ALWAYS UNANNOUNCED. 
DEFINED AS THE PROBABILITY THAT THE BASIC EVENT OCCURS DIVIDED 
BY THE PROBABILITY OF THE TOP EVENT, 
• \ 
TABLE 2 PRELIMINARY RESULTS 
FPS SIGNAL-RESPONSE ANALYSIS 
RANGE OF FAILURES (F) OF 
MAJOR SYSTEM AVAILABILITY SUBSYSTEM COMPONENTS FOR 
SUBSYSTEMS PER DEMAND A "SUBSYSTEM FAILURE' 
HALON 1301 - K F < 8 FOR THE MOST PART 
THESE ARE SUPERVISED. 
INCIPIENT FIRE 
DETECTION (iFD) - 1 < F < 2 SAME AS ABOVE. 
ZIU/FIU 99A K F SUPERVISED BY FIRE 
DEPARTMENT, 
SPRINKLER(S) 99.1% K F SUPERVISED BY IN-LINE 
WET-PIPE (WITHOUT PRESSURE SWITCHES, 
HEADS) 
'» 
TABLE 3 QUANTITATIVE RESULTS 
THE PROBABILITY OF FAILURE (TO ACTIVATE AS REQUIRED) WAS CALCUUTED 
ON A PER DEMAND BASIS OVER A FIFTEEN YEAR PERIOD. THE PROBABILITY 
OF INADVERTENT RELEASE WAS ESTIMATED ON A PER YEAR BASIS. THE 
RESULTS OF THE TWO ANALYSIS INDICATED THE FOLLOWING PROBABILITIES 
FOR THE 2X1 IB DRY PIPE/PREACTiON SYSTEM AND SHIVA'S WET PIPE 
SYSTEM. 
SYSTEM TYPE PROBABILITY ESTIMATES. 
INABILITY TO OPERATE 
WHEN REQUIRED 
INADVERTENT RELEASE 
WET PIPE SPRINKLER 
SYSTEM (SHIVA) 
02% 1.6 x 10" 6* 
DRY PIPE/PREACTION 
SYSTEM (2X1 IB) 
18% (LESS) THAN 
1C" 6 
1967-1976 SPRINKLER LEAKAGE LOSSES (HEADS OPENED) . FACTORY 
MUTUAL RESEARCH 25 OCT, .19/7, PREMATURE OPERATION DUE TO ALL 
CAUSES (OVER-HEATING. FREEZING, MECHANICAL INJURY, CORROSION, 
EXCESS PRESSURE, ETC,) 
U 
TABLE 1 SPRINKLER SYSTEM RELIABILITY COMPARISON 
WITH NFPA AND FACTORY MUTUAL STATISTICS 
% SATISFACTORY m 
DATA SOURCE PERIOD NO, OF FIRES PERFORMANCE F A 
NFPA 1921-1969 81,215 96.2 
AUSTRALIAN DATA - - 99,8 
UNITED KINGDOM - - 91.1 98% 
FACTORY MUTUAL 
o WET-PIPE 1970-1977 2,112 91.5 
o DRY-PIPE 757 ' 86.0 82% 
o PRE-ACTION 7 85.7 
INERTIAL CONFINEMENT FUSION CONCEPT 
Atrbiph#i Formation Comprwion Ignition Bum 
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ripid^hittthtiurfict rocktt-likt btowoff of full coro rotcrwi 1000 -10,000 timts burmprndi 
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